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Tolerable risk of harm: HSE's Reducing Risks, Protecting People applied to trees

The Health and Safety Executive sorts individual risk of death into unacceptable, tolerable and broadly acceptable regions. Tree safety guidance puts the boundary of broadly acceptable at one in a million a year, and the risk from trees at about one in 15 million.

Checked against the sources at the bottom of this page on October 15, 2026. Rules, fees and pay change: the source has the last word.

This page reports what the official source says. It is not legal advice: ask the office named here. The office is the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in Great Britain. The framework is HSE's, from Reducing Risks, Protecting People (R2P2), and is reported as four publications quote it. They are the National Tree Safety Group (NTSG) guidance of 2024, the VALID system, the QTRA owners, and Torbay Council's 2010 strategy.

The three regions

The NTSG guidance, Common sense risk management of trees (2024), says HSE developed the Tolerability of Risk (TOR) framework in Reducing Risk, Protecting People (HSE Books, 2001). The framework describes three regions of risk: unacceptable, tolerable and broadly acceptable. They are defined by the annual risk, as a ratio, of one individual dying from exposure to a hazard. The regions inform management decisions.

NTSG quotes HSE on the broadly acceptable region. Risks there are comparable to those people regard as insignificant or trivial in daily life. HSE as regulator would not usually require further action unless reasonably practicable measures exist, and duty holders must still reduce risks wherever it is reasonably practicable to do so.

The 1 in 1,000,000 boundary

NTSG quotes HSE as believing that an individual risk of death of one in a million per annum, for workers and the public, is a very low level of risk. HSE says it should serve as a guideline for the boundary between the broadly acceptable and tolerable regions.

The 1 in 10,000 figure

Torbay Council's Tree Risk Management Strategy of 2010 turns to the British Medical Association guide Living with Risk (Henderson, 1987). The guide concludes that few people would commit their own resources to reduce an annual risk of death already as low as 1 in 10,000. Torbay suggests 1 in 10,000 as a place to start for the limit of acceptable risk. It then quotes HSE as saying that for members of the public with a risk imposed on them in the wider interest, HSE would set the limit at 1 in 10,000 per annum.

The QTRA owners print the same figures in their advisory thresholds: 1/1,000, 1/10,000 and 1/1,000,000. Their wording calls risk "tolerable if ALARP" between the second and third boundaries, and "broadly acceptable" when the risk is already ALARP, with no action required. ALARP means as low as reasonably practicable. The thresholds are set out in the guide to QTRA.

The framework applied to trees

NTSG draws three consequences for particular trees.

  • Where a tree presents a broadly acceptable risk, no risk management intervention would normally be expected, unless there is another management objective.
  • Where the risk is tolerable, a risk-assessment process would support decisions aimed at controlling the risk as low as reasonably practicable, within the context of the benefits the tree provides.
  • Where the risk is unacceptable, control measures would apply to deter, prohibit or otherwise reduce exposure to the hazard. NTSG gives examples: preventing access to the area, pruning or other tree work, or tree removal.

NTSG puts the risk of death from falling trees across the UK public at about one in 15 million per year, drawing on data for 1997 to 2021. That is 15-fold less than the one in a million figure. NTSG adds that the low national probability should not be relied on for the frequency or rigour of inspection of a given tree, and that the risk from one tree can in rare cases be extremely high.

VALID's use of the framework

VALID says it applies ISO 31000 and the Tolerability of Risk Framework to tree risk-benefit management. It uses four traffic-light ratings:

  • Not Acceptable (red): risks will be reduced to an Acceptable level.
  • Not Tolerable (amber): risks that are not ALARP; they are reduced to an Acceptable level, with lower priority than Not Acceptable risks.
  • Tolerable (amber): risks that are ALARP and will not be reduced; they may need assessment more often than Acceptable risks.
  • Acceptable (green): risks will not be reduced.

Sources